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Amidst the juridical heterosexisml of our legal system, the few 
successful lesbian and gay cases stand out as brilliant, hopeful harbingers 
of the future. With good cause, lesbian and gay people have hailed state 
cases that indicate Bowers v. Hardwick2 has not contaminated all 
American courts.3 Although termed "victories" for the lesbian and gay 
community, several recent New York cases exclude many queer4 legal 
needs. Four cases, Braschi v. Stahl as so^.,^ In the Matter of the Adoption 
of Evan,6 M.A.B. v. R.B.7 and Thomas S. v. Robin Y.,8 embody the law's 
1. I use heterosexism to refer to the belief that heterosexuality is superior to 
homosexuality, and the enforcement of this belief on juridical and societal plains. Homophobia, 
on the other hand, refers to a more psychological and individual reaction to homosexuality and 
the cultural identities that surround it. 
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For further comment on Bowers v. Hardwick, see Rhonda 
Copelon, A Crime Not Fit to be Named: Sex, Lies, and the Constitution, in % P O L ~ C S  OFLAW: 
A PROGRE~~NE C ~ Q U E  (David Kairys, ed., 1990); Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: 
Act and Identity In &After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993), and commentaries 
following by Anne B. Goldstein, 79 VA. L. REV. 1781 (1993), and Kendall Thomas, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1805 (1993); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 
(1992). 
3. State cases also hold great importance for lesbian and gay rights litigation since the 
Reagan-Bush administration's federal judicial appointments have reduced the possibility of 
succession federal courts. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Admonitions for Legal Services 
Advocates Contemplating Federal Litigation, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 11, 12 1993, noted in 
Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Correctiorts Litigation, 142 U .  PA. L. REV. 639, n.6 
(1994) (noting increasingly conservative tendencies of the federal bench). 
4. "The term 'queer,' juxtaposed to the 'lesbian and gay' of the subtitle, is intended to 
mark a certain critical distance from the latter, by now established and often convenient, formula" 
Teresa de Lauretis, Introduction to Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities, 3 D-CES: 
A J. OFFEMINI~~CULTUR~LSTUDIES iv. Section I will fiuther develop the concept of "queer." 
5. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). 
6. 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1992). 
7. 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1986). 
8. 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Fam. Ct. 1993). 
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progress on lesbian and gay issues? This essay will question the value of 
these decisions as victories for our community. Queer identity 
fundamentally intersects with other marginal identities of individuals and 
communities and serves as the central theoretical basis for my critique of 
these cases. Creating queer coinmunities with widely varying legal needs 
specific to various classes, races, gender and sexual identifications. Given 
the breadth of marginal identities, an analysis of these cases will 
demonstrate the value of these cases to certain queers over others. While 
recognizing the progressive aspects of these cases, the narrowness of 
these lesbian and gay "victories" puts their status into question. The 
intersectionality of class, race, sexual practice and gender preference and 
an implicit interrogation of the value of law in social change inform this 
critique. The marginalizing and essentializing tendencies of litigation 
reveal it to be a flawed technique for change for queer communities. 
Reliance on litigation for the direction of the movement is dangerous 
because these essentializing and marginalizing aspects of litigation have 
the potential to further divide and weaken queer political strength. 
Litigation should follow strategy, not define it. 
Part I of this essay will introduce the queer theories underlying 
my critique and will outline the discrete positioning of lesbian and gay 
identity and community10 which labels these cases "victories." The 
intersectionality of queer identity is the key blind spot in the litigation 
model. The queer continuum, a re-conceptualization of Adrienne Rich's 
lesbian continuum, delineates the spectrum of queer identity. Part I1 will 
explore the facts, issues and holdings of these four cases. My 
examination of these cases will reveal how they grant some rights to "but- 
9. "Cases from within the community often center on the very issues heterosexuals take 
for granted. For instance, the broadening of the definition of 'family' in succession of rent- 
s t a b i i  leases in Braschi, or Surmgate Preminger's decision permitting a non-biological lesbian 
parent to adopt her lover's child. L i e  Thomas S. v. Robin Y., these cases involved basic rights 
which had not been afforded members of the lesbian and gay commukty." LORI COHEN, June 
1993 Lmms TO THE LESBIANIGAY L. NOTES 4. In addition to the post-Harmvick importance of 
state cases, the visibility of New york's lesbian and gay community, perhaps the world's largest, 
also makes these cases so prominent. 
10. I use the phrase "lesbian and gay" here in some opposition to "queer" because of the 
relatively legitimized nature of the ''lesbian and gay" community. Common usage of related 
terms is also informative. See, e.g., Lea Delaria, Address at the March on Washington for 
Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Rights (April 25, 1993) (stating 'What's the difference between a 
lesbian and a dyke? Thirty thousand dollars a year!") I also use the word "community" rather 
than "communities" because the discrete notion of lesbian and gay identity also posits a discrete 
lesbian and gay community rather than multiple communities. 
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fory' queers, who, "but-for" their being lesbian or gay, would be "perfect 
citizens."ll I will discuss how the rules and applications of these cases 
either exclude some queer communities or address issues irrelevant to 
other communities. The communities whose interest I specifically 
address are poor queers, queers of color, sexual subversives, and gender 
subversive queers. These limitations should figure prominently in the 
consideration of litigation's role in queer activism. In Part Ill, I conclude 
by outlining the implications of this critique for the relationship between 
queer communities and litigation. 
In this section, I will first establish that queer identity intersects 
with sex, race, class, sexual practice and gender preference. A queer legal 
program should account for this multiplicity. Adrienne Rich's lesbian 
continuum broadens our notion of community, providing the basis for a 
queer critique of these cases and for political action respecting difference. 
Finally, I critique a discrete notion of lesbian and gay identity 
promulgated by litigation that ignores the intersectionality of queer 
identity. 
A. "Queer" as a Category 
The term "queer" often engenders controversy, perhaps owing to 
the radical nature of those who most notably brought it into use in the 
lesbian and gay communities, ACT-UP12 and Queer Nation.13 Its 
1 1. Ruthann Robson, Address at the Conference of the National Lesbian and Gay Lawyers 
Association (NLGLA) Oct. 24,1992. 
12. Indeed, ACT-UP revived the radicalism of lesbian and gay communities that has led to 
the exploration of more radical identities such as "queer." "What we are seeing among the young 
who make up ACT UP is once again gay men and lesbian women acting in concert, welcoming and 
appreciating each other's differentness, and also welcoming minority people. Beyond that change 
in personnel, what ACT UP has discovered in the process of struggle is the full extent of entrenched 
privilege which characterizes our society . . . Because of those insights gathered during ACT UP'S 
struggles, I think we may yet see the birth of a new gay movement which is once more radically 
oriented." Martin Duberman, Historian, Address to Ceremony Inaugurating Lesbian and Gay Pride 
and History Month in New York City, June 1, 1989, in DOUGLAS CRIVP with ADAM ROLSTON, 
AIDS D ~ O G W H I C S  (1990). Crimp's book provides an effective catalog of ACT-UP'S politics, 
images, and achievements. 
13. For a discussion of Queer Nation, see FRANK BROWNING, Queer Rage, in THE C~LIUE 
OF DESIRE: PARADOX AND P E R V E R S ~  IN GAY LIVES TODAY 26 (1993). A manifesto of queer 
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complex meaning led to a relatively rapid spread to lesbian and gay 
academia14 A word originally used to deride a broad group of social 
outcasts, "queer" conveys an unequivocally subversive relationship with 
hegemony. Its historically negative meaning calls into question the 
accuracy of categories themselves by complicating the signs of positive 
and negative identification. "The minute you say 'queer' you are 
necessarily calling into question exactly what you mean when you say 
it."l5 "Queer" as a political category avoids the essentialist meaning 
often presumed by the terms "lesbian and gay."l6 This essentialism has 
been much criticized by academics and legal scholars as both inaccurate17 
and destructive.18 Normative categories must be context-driven in order 
to hold any meaning. "Queer," unlike "lesbian and gay" does not merely 
describe sexual practices, but a destabilization of heterosexual 
hegemony.19 "llr]he term 'queer' in its openness . . . suggests the truly 
polyrnorphous nature of our difference, of difference within the lesbian 
and gay community . . . [Qlueer includes within it a necessarily expansive 
impulse that allows us to think about potential differences within that 
rubric."2o Thus "queer" is a political category permitting both the 
activism is ANONYMOUS QUEERS, QUEERS READ THIS (1990) reprinted in WILUAM B. RUBENSIEIN, 
ed. LESBIANS, GAY MEN, ANDTHELAW 45 (1993). See infa note 26. 
14. For a brief study of recent use. of "queer," see Lisa Duggan, Making It Perfectly Queer, 
22 SOCIAUS~REV. 11(1992). 
15. Phillip Brian Harper, Multi/Queer/Culture, in 24 V O L ~  RADICALAMFBICA 30 (1990). 
16. For a summary of the related debate on essentialism and contructionism, see e.g., John 
Bosweil, Revolutions, Universals, and Sexual Categories, 58-59 SWGUNDI 89 (1982-83); see 
also Cheshire Calhoun, Denaturalizing and Desexualizing Lesbian and Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1859 (1993) (arguing that the debate of essentialism and constructivism should employ more 
complex understandings of each position than have previously been used). Michel Foucault's work 
on sexuality also provides a lynchpin to the constructionist argument. See MICHELFOUCAULT, THE 
HETORY OF S E X U ~ :  ANINI'RODUC~ON (Robert Hurley, trans.) at 43. 
17. See, e.g., David M. Halperin, One Hundred Years of Homosexuality, in THE MMF OF 
THE GREEKS (Milad Doueihi ed.), 16 D I A ~ C S  34 (1986); Robert Padgug, Sexual Matters: 
Rethinhg Sexuality in History, in 20 RADICAL HETORY REV. 3 (1979); Natalie Angier, Srudy of 
Sexual Orientation Doesn't Neatly Fit Mold, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1993 (discussing the debate 
among lesbian and gay activists whether biological evidence of homosexuality will benefit or 
hinder the effort for legal protection). 
18. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for 
.Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 915 (1989) (arguing that equal protection 
claims of immutability for lesbian and gay people are both inaccurate and legally ineffective). 
19. "I will ultimately suggest that if there is an essential gay identity, it is not best described 
in terms of same-sex desire. Instead, it is best described as an identity that breaks heterosexual 
law." Calhoun, supra note 16, at 1860. 
20. Harper, supra note 15, at 30. 
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recognition of differences and intersectionalities and expansion to a 
continuum of subversive people. 
B. Queer Intersectionality 
A lot of times when you're black and gay, you don't know 
whether the discrimination is due to your blackness or 
your gayness.21 
Bell Hooks, in Ain't I A Woman?, denounced the white women's 
movement for universalizing white notions of c'woman," thereby erasing 
the existence of black women.22 Similarly, discussing the parties in these 
cases as lesbian or gay without specifying other aspects of their social 
position implies that they occupy a universal position. The effect of these 
false universals is to erase other queers and to ignore their very different 
experiences. Black women face discrimination both as Blacks and as 
women. They also face discrimination specific to their subject position, 
which cannot be analyzed merely from a "Black" perspective or from a 
"woman's" perspective. Kimberle Crenshaw describes this collision of 
identities and discriminations: 
Black women are sometimes excluded from feminist 
theory and antiracist policy discourse because both are 
predicated on a discrete set of experiences that often does 
not accurately reflect the interaction of race and gender. 
These problems of exclusion cannot be solved simply by 
including Black women within an already established 
analytical structure. Because the intersectional experience 
is greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis 
that does not take intersectionality into account cannot 
sufficiently address the particular manner in which Black 
women are subordinated. Thus, for feminist theory and 
antiracist policy discourse to embrace the experiences and 
concerns of Black women, the entire framework that has 
been used as a basis for "translating women's experience" 
21. Ronald Prince, quoted in Lena Williams, Blacks Rejecting Gay Rights As a Battle 
Equal to Theirs, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1993, at A1 (discussing Black reluctance to support lesbian 
and gay rights for religious and historical reasons). 
22. See generally BELLHOOKS, AIN'TI A WOMAN? (1981). 
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or "the Black experience" into concrete policy demands 
must be rethought and recast.23 
Queer identity is intersectional, since most queers24 face multiple 
aspects of discrimination, as women, as people of color, as poor people, 
as cross-gendered people, and as sexual subversives. The multiplicity of 
the discrimination that queers face is thus greater than anti-lesbian and 
anti-gay discrimination. Queer identity implicates opposition to these 
discriminations: "Being queer . . . means everyday fighting oppression; 
homophobia, racism, misogyny, the bigotry of religious hypocrites and 
our own self-hatred.-25 Just as feminist q d  antiracist agendas fail Black 
women by centering on femaleness or Blackness, so the liberal lesbian 
and gay position fails by identifying the community solely on same-sex 
p m e r  choice, ignoring the class, race, ethnicity, sexual and gender 
identity diversity of the queer community. Since "the homophobia 
23. Kimberle Crenshaw, Dernarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex. A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. 
CM. LEGALE 139,140. Crenshaw describes the b i d  Black women face by liberation movements: 
"Black women are regarded either as too much like women or Blacks and the compounded nature 
of their experience is absorbed into the collective experiences of eithergroup or as too different, in 
which case Black women's Blackness or femaleness sometimes has placed their needs and 
perspectives at the margin of the feminist and Black liberationist agendas . . . . While it could be 
argued that this failure represents an absence of political will to include Black women, I believe that 
it reflects an uncritical and disturbiig acceptance of dominant ways of thinking about 
discrimination." Id at 150. Though I quote extensively from this brilliant piece of legal 
scholarship, a closer familiarity with Crenshaw's argument would certainly enrich an understanding 
of my argument 
24. My calculation here that most queers are intersectional is based on an assumption of 
parity between lesbians and gays. Various studies provide contrary evidence to this assumption. 
See, e.g., ALFRED C. KNY ET AL, SEX BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN (1948); ALFRED C. 
WEY, SEXBEHAMORINTHEHUMANF~AE (1953). However, given the problematic essentialist 
bases for such statistics, I prefer to rely on my experience which indicates some degree of parity 
between lesbians and gays. I also cannot ignore differences between lesbians and gays that might 
impact on such perceptions. Manuel Castells, urban geographer states: "Lesbians, unlike gay men, 
tend not to concentrate in a given territory, but establish social and interpersonal networks." 
MANUEL CASIEI~S, 'I& CrrY AND THE GRASSROOTS: A ( 3 0 s - C U L m  THEORY OF URBAN 
S m M o m m m  140 (1983). 
25. ANONYMOUS QUEERS, QUEERS READ THIS (1990) reprinted in Rubenstein, supra note 
13. Anonymous Queers further describes queer identity: "Being queer means leading a different 
sort of life. It's not about the mainstream, profit margins, patriotism, patriarchy, or beiig 
assimilated. It's not about executive directors, privilege and elitism. It's about being on the 
margins, defining ourselves; it's about gender-fuck and' secrets, what's beneath the belt and deep 
inside the heart; it's about the night. Being queer is "grass roots" because we know that everyone 
of us, every body, every cunt, every heart, and ass and dick is a world of pleasure waiting to be 
explored. Everyone of us is a world of infinite possibility." Id at 46. 
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directed against both males and females is not arbitrary or gratuitous, but 
tightly knit into the texture of family, gender, age, class, and race 
relati0ns,"~6 we must recognize queer intersectionality and strategize 
through it. 
Focusing on the intersectionality of queer identity might permit 
lesbian and gay legal strategists to address lesbian and gay legal issues 
without ignoring the unique way in which women, people of color, poor 
people, sexually subversive people, cross-gendered people and others face 
anti-queer discrimination. Attention to these intersectionalities may help 
provide the largely white, middle-class lesbian and gay legal community 
with the perspective to litigate for a far broader sense of community. 
C. The Queer Continuum 
Intersectionality's inclusion of specific identity differences raises 
inherently personal issues. Social change should reflect the queer 
politicization of personal identities. The lesbian continuum, which 
comprises "the multitude of identities which constitute lesbian 
existence,"" helps reconceptualize the queer continuum. "Lesbian 
existence comprises both the breaking of a taboo and the rejection of a 
compulsory way of life."28 Compulsory heterosexuality, the system 
which forces women to define themselves in relation to men and erases 
lesbian existence, is a "political in~titution."~g Through compulsory 
heterosexuality, men dictate women's (heter0)sexuality and thus prevent 
them from centering their expression in womanhood. The lesbian 
continuum is the range of women's resistance to compulsory 
heterosexuality. The queer continuum is thus the range of sexual 
identities which subvert compulsory heterosexuality. Rather than focus 
on women's resistance as does the lesbian continuum, the queer 
continuum centers on the resistance of people of all sexes. However, 
several similarities between the queer continuum and the lesbian 
continuum provide a useful comparison. 
26. EVE KOSOFSKY !?.EDGEWICK, BETWEEN MEN: ENGLISH LITERATURE AND MALE 
HOMOSOCIALDESIRE 3-4(1985) noted in Kendall Thomas, supra note 2, at 1515 n.282. 
27. Adrienne Rich, Compulsoly Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in LESBIAN 
AND GAY STUDIES READER 239 (Henry Abelove, Michsle Aina Barale, David M. Halperin eds., 
1993). 
28. Id 
29. Id at 232. 
Heinonline - -  4 Law & Sexuality: Rev. Lesbian & Gay Legal Issues 90 1994 
19941 QUEER lNT.ERSE~ONALJTY 9 1 
1. Inclusion 
The queer continuum includes a wide range of people who resist 
compulsory heterosexuality. My goal in using Rich's model is to expand 
queer identity to many people. Not just lesbian and gay people belong to 
the queer continuum; it includes all sexual minorities. Many of us are 
dykes, fags, bisexuals, radical feminists and other subversive 
heterosexuals, transvestites, transsexuals, poor queers, Black queers, 
Asian-American queers, Latino queers, homos, drag queens, leather 
queens and dykes, muscle queens, lipstick lesbians, .bull dykes, gay 
women, etc. The vast intersectionality and diversity of queer identities all 
situate along the queer continuum; extending to those who do not identify 
with it. 
2. Identification 
The lesbian continuum includes women who behave 
homosocially but do not identify themselves as lesbians. The queer 
continuum also describes people who do not identify as queer but 
nonetheless subvert traditional gender and sexual identities.30 The 
breadth of queer existence, like lesbian existence, draws on resistant acts 
and not exclusively on self-identification. Thus, even some of the men 
who have tearoom sex, who might loathe the word "queer" and even 
"gay,"31 are queer because they commit acts of sexual subversion against 
compulsory heterosexuality. Thus, even the demonic Roy Cohn32 and J. 
30. Radical scholars, like radical activists, initially saw "queer" as a word which could 
describe women and men, whites and people of color, muscle boys and drag queens. However, I 
recognize that many women and people of color feel "queer" erases their more intersectional 
identities as "gay" did and do not identify as such. However, I have found no word which replaces 
the theoretical value of "queer" in applying subversion to a broad spectrum of identities. > 
31. Loathing lesbian or gay identity is not necessarily a condition of being closeted. See, cf: 
Mark A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, 
and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MAMI L. REV. 511, 591-99 (1992) 
(discussing the individual and community costs of hiding one's homosexuality); David H. Pollack, 
Forced Out of the Closet: S m l  Orientation and the Legal Dilemma of "Outing", 46 U. MAMI L. 
REV. 711,716-719 (1992) (discussing the relationship between homosexual identity and privacy). 
32. NICHOLAS VON HOFFMAN, CmzEN COHN (1988). The character Roy Cohn in Angels in 
America states 'This is not hypocrisy. This is reali ty... Because what I am is defined entirely by 
who I am. Roy Cohn is not a homosexual. Roy Cohn is a heterosexual man ... who fucks around 
with guys." TONY KUSHNER, ANGELS N AMnuc.4 PART ONE: APPROACHES at 46 
(lleater Communications Group, 1993). 
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Edgar Hoover33 are on the queer continuum because of their covert 
homosexuality and transvestitism, despite their oppressive misidenti- 
fication. 
3. Nonerasure and Intersectionality 
Facially, intersectionality and the queer continuum contradict one 
another. While intersectionality focuses on difference, the unity of a 
continuum might imply the erasure of difference. However, variation is a 
fundamental part of the continuum: otherwise it would be entirely 
unitary. Political unity through the respect of difference, a fundamental 
strategy for subordinated communities; might be furthered by combining 
these two concepts, by building on Rich's continuum precisely to avoid 
collapsing different queer communities into a unitary queer identity. "To 
equate lesbian existence with male homosexuality because each is 
stigmatized is to erase female reality once again."34 The queer 
continuum's intersectional focus ideally includes the specific needs of 
various communities. However, "[tlhe risk is that queer theoretical work 
will mirror queer doctrinal work in perpetuating the invisibility of 
lesbians."35 Respecting intersectionality within the continuum might 
avoid perpetuating this invisibility. Although many different types of 
people are queer, their queerness does not erase their singularity. 
The queer continuum invokes a broad community encompassing 
a multiplicity of identities. It permits us to envision this community 
without erasing the intersectionality of separate identities. The 
recognition of difference often leaves little space for broad political 
action. But the queer continuum, connecting the personal to the political, 
permits queer intersectionality to surpass the level of difference into a 
potential program for change. 
33. A N ~ O N Y  SUMMERS, OFFICIAL AND CONFIDEN~JAL: THE SECRE~ LIFE OF J. EDGAR 
HOOVER (1993). 
34. Rich, supra note 27, at 239. 
35. RUIHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW 22 (1992). Robson continues her critique: 
"Except for lesbian custody cases, and a few recent discussions of lesbians in the military, most 
doctrinal legal discussions have focused almost exclusively on gay men. . . . If this trend continues, 
queer legal theory will in fact be gay male legal theory." Id. 
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4. Empowerment 
The queer continuum unites a broad range of disempowered 
communities, surpassing the "lesbian and gay" community's relatively 
limited political reach. By including occasionally subversive people and 
people who face intersectional discrimination, the queer continuum 
def~nes .broad resistance to compulsory heterosexuality. This political 
constitution of many subversive identities may broaden notions of 
community in an empowering way. Respecting other intersecting 
identities would help create the trust necessary for alliances with other 
subordinate groups. It is through the lens of this broad-based community 
that I will analyze lesbian and gay rights litigation. 
D. Litigation and the Limits of Liberalism 
Courts recognize targets of discrimination solely on the basis of 
belonging to a specific protected class. As Professor Crenshaw asserts: 
"Because the scope of antidiscrimination law is so limited, sex iind race 
discrimination have come to be defined in terms of the experiences of 
those who are privileged but for their racial or sexual characteristics."36 
In her discussion of DeGrqffenreid v. General Motors?7 she exposes a 
federal district court's inability to perceive intersectional discrimination: 
"Under this view, black women are protected only to the extent that their 
experiences coincide with those of either of the two groups plack men 
and white women]."38 Similarly, courts considering lesbian and gay 
issues only look at the issue of sexual orientation.39 To fulfjll the 
requirements of the court, lesbian and gay litigation requires a client who, 
but for that trait, would not have fallen victim to discrimination. 
Indeed, Ruthann Robson has coined the term "but-for queef' as 
someone who, "but for'' their being queer, would be perfect30 "But-for 
queers" constitute the ideal parties to a test case, because someone facing 
more than just sexual orientation discrimination might confuse the issue 
before the court. "But-for" queer litigants permit the courts to focus on 
36. Crenshaw, supra note 23, at 151. 
37. 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976). 
38. Crenshaw, supra note 23, at 143. 
39. The widely used term "sexual orientation" implies sexuality to be a fixed identity, a 
notion contested by many sexual subversives in the queer community. For them, the term "sexual 
preference," while outdated, might more accurately express the fluidity of sexualities. 
40. Robson, supra note 11. 
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anti-lesbian and gay discrimination independent from other 
discrimination. Litigation about discrete lesbian and gay identity leads to 
legal remedies centered in that identity. Courts thereby follow other 
juridical norms that exclude on the basis of class, sex, race, sexual 
practice and gender performance. While "other" queers may benefit from 
such litigation, their exclusion from lesbian and gay litigation means that 
intersectional discrimination is not addressed by that litigation. 
p]he measure of a just society is not how it treats people 
who look like Ozzie and Hamet. That's the easy part. A 
just society must offer the same full citizenship to the 
flamboyant dressers . . .as it does to those who look[ ] 
"just like the people next door."-New York Times41 
41. Washington-by Way of Stonewall, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1993, at ,420. Because this 
editorial, responding to the 1993 March on Washington for Lesbian and Gay Rights, so eloquently 
defends the position I take up in this essay, I quote the full text: 
The modem gay rights movement started a quarter of a century ago, 
when police raided the Stonewall Inn, a cross-dressers' bar in Greenwich 
Village. The incident led to three days of civil disobedience, much of it by 
men in drag. 
Stonewall convinced gay men and lesbians that they were under 
attack and that they needed to organize for political action and demonstrations, 
like the one last weekend in Washington. 
This march was Ozzie and Haniet compared with the Stonewall days 
or even with the annual gay pride parade in New York. As The Los Angeles 
Times's Bettina Boxall wrote: "They wanted to show to America that they 
were 'regular' people, the kind that live next door, go to work every day, and 
pay their taxes." While the march included the exotic-some bare-breasted 
women, transvestites and people clad in leather gear-for the most part, the 
demonstrators were conventional, orderly, and well behaved." 
"Ordinary" and 'The People Next Door" were mantras of the 
weekend, as though the right of full citizenship depends on how one chooses to 
dress. It doesn't. And it's a dangerous idea 
The fixation on "normalcy" is understandable given how gay Americans have been 
demonized in recent years. But the measure of a just society is not how it treats people who look 
like Ozzie and Haniet. That's the easy part. A just society must offer the same full citizenship to 
the flamboyant dressers in last weekend's parade as it does to those who looked "just like the 
people next door." Id. 
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A. Queer Legal Nee& 
Awareness of queer intersectionality should reshape our 
conception of queer legal needs. The focus of lesbian and gay legal 
needs, the extension of rights to people without regard to sexual 
orientation, does not necessarily answer queer legal needs. Intersectional 
queers might face exclusion by other forces in the law, such as classism, 
sexism, or racism. Their legal priorities might differ from those of "but- 
for" queers. Poor queers might not find inclusion by courts looking at 
education, profession, and property in evaluating their claims. Their 
access to litigation is itself limited. Their ability to conceal behavior 
rejected by the courts is reduced32 Economic inequality leaves many 
queers of color facing this same classism. In addition, their family 
structures and cultural attitudes about homosexuality often differ from 
those of white people. Furthermore, queers of color might define their 
queerness differently from white people and from each other33 Since 
manifestations of homophobia and heterosexism are culturally contingent, . 
remedies countering white heterosexism might not address this 
discrimination. Courts relying on traditional sexual and gender norms 
might deny sexual and gender subversive litigants and ignore their 
priorities. Their priorities in the recognition of relationships by courts 
may diier as well. These queer legal needs therefore find little relief in 
the courts. This treatment by the courts cannot be entirely disassociated 
42. See, erg., White v. Thompson 569 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1990), in which a lesbian 
mother's use of marijuana was cited by the courts in declaring her neglectful. Had she and her 
lover been able to afford more than a trailer home, their privacy might have prevented the court 
from attaining such information. For a more extensive discussion of this case, see infra note 102 
and accompanying text 
43. See, e.g., Jennie Livingston's film on Black and Latino drag culture in New York, PARB 
Is BURNING (Off-White Productions, 1991); B E ~ L  HOOKS, Is Paris Burning?, in BLACK LOOKS: 
R A ~ E A N D R E P R E S ~ ~ A ~ O N  147 (1992); Robert F. Reid-Phm, The Spectacle of Blackness VOL 24 
No. 4 RADICAL AMERICA 57 (1993). Although Livingston's film is "undoubtedly one of the most 
popular and critically acclaimed representations of Blackness to have emanated from the gay 
community in this decade," her work is by no means an unproblematic representation of the culture 
it represents. Id See also Oscar Montero, Before the Parade Passes By: Latino Queers and 
Nationul Identity VOL 24 No.4 RADICALAMENCA 16 (1990) ('From the start, any critical stance 
in this area is bound to be awkward, but no more so than the very notion of samesex sexual 
identity in a Latino context, where the English word "gay" is a recent borrowing. . . !The terms for 
samesex sexual identity are] all of them disparaging: pato, pafa, prijaro, cochona (male duck, 
female duck, bid, sow), all synonyms of 'queer."') Id; Tomas Amaguer, Chicam Men: A 
Cartography of Homosexual Identity and Behavior, 3.2 DEFERENCES: A J. OF FEMINIST CULTURAL 
STUDIES 75 (1991) reprinted in THELESBIAN AND GAY SIXDIESREADER, supra note 27 at 255. 
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from discrimination within queer communities. Sexism,44 racism,45 
classism, internalized homophobia, and other discriminations that plague 
heterosexual society also divide queer communities. By furthering "but- 
foi' queer interests over intersectional queer interests, "gay and lesbian7' 
litigation may deepen such rifts.46 
B. Lesbian and Gay "Victories " 
Because my critique of each of the following "lesbian and gay 
legal victories7' is necessarily based on multiple perspectives which often 
merge, I will summarize the cases before criticizing them. 
1. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co. 
Braschi is perhaps the most prominent case in New York dealing 
with lesbian and gay issues, partly because it was the first case in which 
New York's highest court recognized lesbian and gay relationships.47 
Upon the death of tenant Leslie Blanchard, Stahl Associates tried to evict 
his lover, Miguel Braschi. Rent control laws, designed to protect tenants 
from exorbitant rents, have non-eviction provisions for co-habiting family 
members. Braschi sued to inherit the rent-controlled tenancy, presenting 
44. See, e.g., MARILYN FRYE, Lesbian Feminism and the Gay Rights Movement: Another 
View of Male Supremacy, Another Separatism, in l& PO= OF 128. Gender 
subversives also face sexism in that their gender performance violates sexist norms of gender roles. 
See, e.g., MANORIEGARBER, VESIED IN- (1992). 
45. See generally, e.g., Ess~x HEMP=, CERFMOMES: PROSE AND POW (1992); Robert 
F. Reid Phan; supra note 44. 
46. Some may claim that these interests are separate from distinctly queer interests. As I 
point out in my discussion of Queer categories, my purpose is specifically to call into question the 
notion that "queer" or "lesbian and gay" legal needs are distinct from those of other marginalized 
P"-'PS. 
47. Indeed, the front page of THE NEW YORK 'hm proclaimed the victory, the first time 
since Hardwick that coverage of a lesbian and gay rights case graced its cover. See Phillip S. Gutis, 
New York Court Dejines Family to Include Homosexuals, N.Y. l ' h ~ s ,  July 7, 1991, at Al. 
William B. Rubenstein, of the American Civil Liberties Union Lesbian and Gay Rights Project, 
who argued the case before the Court of Appeals, stated: 'Today's decision is a ground-breaking 
victory for lesbians and gay men.. . It marks the most important single step forward in American 
law towards legal recognition of lesbian and gay relationships." Id "We heralded Braschi as a 
tremendous breakthrough, not only because the Court of Appeals recognized a gay or lesbian 
couple as family, but also because of its ground-breaking language dismissing genetic history and 
fictitious legal distinctions as the only basis on which families may be defined." Paula Ettelbrick, 
June 1993 L E ~  TO THE LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES 1. 
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the Court with the issue of whether the non-eviction provision should be 
extended to same-sex couples. 
The Cow of Appeals approved several criteria for a same-sex 
couple to be considered "family" for rent control purposes38 For tenancy 
inheritance, cohabitation was the most fundamental requirement. The 
Court put forth the following factors as other indicators of a relationship 
deserving the protection of the non-eviction clause: "exclusivity and 
longevity of the relationship, the level of emotional and financial 
commitment, the manner in which the parties have conducted their 
everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and the reliance placed 
upon one another for daily family services."49 Despite the specificity of 
these factors, they are merely indicators, not requirements of proving a 
relationship to be sufficiently family-like.50 
Having established the indicators for an appropriate test, the 
Court evaluated the BraschiBlanchard couple. Various aspects of their 
lives so closely mirrored the criteria that one suspects the test was 
designed to fit the couple.51 After evaluating the Braschi-Blanchard 
couple's relationship, the Court granted Braschi noneviction protection 
and tenancy inheritance, finding him to have been one of "two adult 
lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an 
emotional and financial commitment and interdependence."52 
2. In the Matter of the Adoption of Evan 
In the Matter of the Adoption of Evan was also hailed as an 
important victory for the lesbian and gay community.53 It was the first 
48. The court arrived at this interpretation of the rent control law using common definitions 
of family from Webster's Dictionary and Ballantine's and Black's Law Dictionaries. Braschi v. 
Stahl Assoc., 543 N.E.2d 49,54 (N.Y. 1989). 
49. Id at55 
50. The Court of Appeals stated: 'These factors are most helpful, although it should be 
emphasized that the presence or absence of one or more of them is not dispositive since it is the 
totality of the relationship as evidenced by the dedication, caring and self-sacrifice of the parties 
which should, in the final analysis, control." Id 
51. The couple "lived together as permanent life partners for more than 10 years." They 
held themselves out to society as a couple, their families viewed them as "spouses," and the 
employees of their apartment building regarded them as "a couple." They shared all financial 
obligations and many of their assets were jointly held. Id 
52. Id at54. 
53. The front page of the Metropalitan Section of THE NEW YORK TIMES announced the 
victory. See Ronald Sullivan, Judge Lets Gay P a m r  Adopt Chis N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1992, at 
Heinonline - -  4 Law & Sexuality: Rev. Lesbian & Gay Legal Issues 97 1994 
New York case in which the lover of a lesbian parent legally adopted her 
partner's child. Diane F. and Valerie C. had been in a committed long 
term relationship since 1978. In 1985, they decided to have a child, and 
Valerie was artificially inseminated with a friend's sperm.54 Since 
Evan's birth, Valerie and Diane had shared all parenting responsibilities. 
In 1991, Diane petitioned to adopt Evan.55 The court employed two 
family law tests to decide the case, the best interests test and the nexus 
test. The best interest test determines which available option would be in 
the child's best interest. While noting financial and emotional reasons 
favoring the adoption, the court clearly viewed the legitimization of 
Evan's family as primary. "As he matures, his connection with two 
involved, loving parents will not be a relationship seen as outside the law, 
but one sustained by the ongoing, legal recognition of an approved, court- 
ordered adoption."56 
The court then employed the second test, the nexus test, set forth 
in New York in Guinan v. Guinan?7 in which the homosexuality of a 
parent becomes relevant only when it adversely affects the welfare of the 
child. Finding the adoption to be in Evan's best interest58 and citing other 
cases of lesbian adoption?g Surrogate Preminger, noting how few 
B 1. "Supporters of gay rights called the ruling significant because New York is a magnet for gay 
people, and many gay couples would now be encouraged to begin adopting children." Id Paula 
Ettelbrick, Director of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, "hailed the ruling, saying it 
'will help solidify lesbian and gay family life in New York."' Id. See ako Edward A. Adams, 
Lesbian Parent Allowed to Adopt; Surrogate Grants Equal Rights to Child's Mother, Her Life 
Parmer,N.Y.L.J.,Jan.31,1992,atl. 
54. As in Thomas S. v. Robin Y., this friend agreed to relinquish any claim to the child. In 
the Matter of the Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997,998 (1992). 
55. Id. 
56. Id at 999. The provision in the Domestic Relations Law that requires the adoptive 
parent's rights to erase those of the biological parent was one obstacle to the adoption after the 
satisfaction of these tests. As cited in Evan, $1 17(1) of the Domestic Relations Law provides that 
"the natural parents of the adoptive child shall be relieved of all parental duties toward and of all 
responsibilities for and shall have no rights over such adoptive child." Invoking the primacy of the 
best interest test over the Domestic Relations Law, Surrogate Prerninger stated "where both 
adoptive and biological parents are in fact co-parents, New York law does not require a destructive 
choice between the two parents." Id at 1000. 
57. 477 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1984). 
58. Evan, 583 N.Y.S. 2d at 999. 
59. Id. at 1002. "While there have been no appellate decisions, several trial courts have 
approved adoptions recognizing both partners in a lesbian couple as the legal parents of the children 
they are jointly raising. In some cases the non-biological mother has been permitted to adopt the 
child bom to her lesbian partner, without terminating the parental rights of the biological mother." 
Surrogate Prerninger goes on to cite many such decisions, including In the Matter of Adoption 
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children today receive the love of two parents, found in favor of the 
adoption: "There is no reason in law, logic or social philosophy to 
obstruct such a favorable situation."60 
3. M.A.B. v. R.B. 
M.A.B. v. R.B. is a 1986 case in which a gay father gained custody 
of his son.61 The parties married in 1970, separated after the husband 
came out to his wife in 1978, and divorced in 1984.62 The mother 
received custody of the three children despite her failing health, though 
the order required her to reside in the state. When M.A.B., the mother, 
applied to the court to permit her to relocate to Florida with the children, 
R.B., the father, cross-motioned for custody of the oldest child, B., and to 
oppose his ex-wife's move to Florida with the two other children.63 B., a 
"poor school citizen," had failed and cut many classes, engaged in fights, 
"mooned" his class, and had stolen money from his mother to buy 
marijuana and alcohol.64 When B. moved in with his father, .his behavior 
improved according to his teachers and principal.65 The court employed 
the best interests test, and determined that R.B.'s stability and close 
contact with school officials had a positive effect on B.66 Furthermore, 
the court determined that M.A.B.'s illness67 rendered her incapable of 
raising B. Living with her elderly parents because of her illness, her 
application to move was viewed as tantamount to awarding custodial 
responsibility to her parents.68 
Petition of Roberta Achtenberg [Cal.Super.Ct., San Francisco Co. No. AD 18490 (198911, that 
involved the adoption petition of a lesbian politician. 
60. Id 
61. Aside from being earlier and less prominent than the other three cases, M.A.B., a 
Suffolk County case, is also the only of the four originating outside New York County. 
62. M.A.B. v. RB., 510N.Y.S. 2d 960,960 (1986). 
63. Id 
64. Idat961. 
65. Indeed, after returning to his mother's custody, B. stopped therapy and his behavior 
worsened. Id at 961-62. 
66. Id at962. 
67. Although M.A.B. blamed her illness on her husband's homosexuality, her 80 
hospitalizations since 1976 suggested otherwise. Id at 962-63. 
68. Id at963. 
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The mother argued that the father's homosexuality would have a 
negative impact on B. Using a form of the nexus test,@ the court found 
that although R.B.'s homosexuality may have caused B. some difficulty, 
R.B. was not to be blamed for such problems.70 The court found that the 
father's behavior, because he did not flaunt his homosexuality before his 
children, did not adversely affect the ~hi ld .7~ Thus, the court determined 
that granting R.B. custody was in B.'s best interesP2 and rejected the 
mother's application to move to Florida.73 
4. Thorn  S. v. Robin Y. 
The heated debate surrounding Thomas S. v. Robin Y. renders it a 
more complex case: unlike the other three cases, supporters of each party 
claim their "victory" would be more progressive for the lesbian and gay 
community.74 The facts themselves have engendered heated argument, 
especially surrounding the nature of Thomas Steel's75 relationship with 
his biological daughter.76 Robin Young and Sandra Russo met in 1979 
and soon decided to have a child.77 RUSSO gave birth to Cade in 19S0 
through artificial insemination by a the sperm of a friend who agreed to 
relinquish any rights to contact the child but would make himself 
available should the child want to know him.78 Not long after Cade's 
69. The court arrives at the nexus test after providing a detailed history of the evolution of 
New York case law on homosexuality in custody cases, arriving at the nexus test. Id at 965. 
70. Id. at 963-64. 
71. Id. at 966. 
72. Id at 969-70. 
73. Id. 
74. My commentary on this debate is based on the LesbiadGay Law Notes of the Lesbian 
and Gay Lawyers Association of Greater New York (LeGal), Arthur Leonard, ed., the responding 
letters, and the LeGaVNY Bar Association Forum on Thomas S. v. Robin Y. at the New York Bar 
Association on June 28, 1993. 
75. Although the decision does not name the parties, their names have appeared in the 
press, permitting me to refer to the parties as such. 
76. Id. 
77. Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 377,377 (Farn. Ct. 1993). The facts presented 
by both sides contradict each other in fundamental ways, a common occurrence in many family law 
cases. Nancy Polikoff, Address to LeGal Forum June 28, 1993, supra note 75. Since my purpose 
is to critique lesbian and gay cases rather than this case's facts, I will focus on the facts as set forth 
in the opinion. Though I do not necessarily accept the facts as presented by the court, I will not 
explore the rejected facts, both since the precedentid value of the case lies in the facts found by the 
court and because a discussion of such facts would inevitably become mired in details unrelated to 
my point. 
78. Thomas S., 599 N.Y.S.2d at 378. 
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birth, Young was impregnated by Steel's sperm under a similar 
agreement and she gave birth to Ry in 1981.79 Responding to queries by 
the child and her older sister, Cade, about their fathers, the mothers 
introduced Steel to the girls.80 Regular contact was established between 
Ry in New York and Steel in San Francisco.81 "In 1990, three years after 
he tested positive for HIV. . . he asked to visit Ry outside the presence of 
[the mothers]. [They] rejected the request, and cut off contact between 
Mr. Steel and the child."82 The Family Court found that establishing 
paternity, even if it were biologically accurate, would be inequitable so 
long after birth.83 Family Court Judge Kaufmann's best interests analysis 
found that to Ry, Steel had been no closer than other family friends; he 
was an outsider attacking her family's security.84 Determining the 
contact between Steel and Ry not significant enough to declare him a 
parent,85 the Family Court denied the petition to establish paternity and 
visitation rights. Overturning this ruling, the Appellate Division found 
that Steel's contact with the child as her biological father required an 
order of filiation be granted.86 
Although this case has divided lesbian and gay legal activists,87 
the ensuing debate has infused the reception of this case with a rare but 
useful critical discussion. This critical discussion prevents this case from 
receiving the Braschi-like victory reception. The conflicting holdings of 
the New York County Family Court and the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court point to the complexity of the use of the word "victory" in 
this case. The contentiousness of this case reflects the complex problems 
of novel parenting and procreative relationships. The bitterness of this 
79. Id 
80. Id at 379. 
81. Id 
82. Edward A. Adams, Spenn Donor Seeks Visitation With Child, N.Y.L.J. Feb. 25,1994, 
at 1. 
83. Robin Y. argued successfully that equitable estoppel should be applied in this case since 
"the failure of a party to assert a right promptly has created circumstances rendering it inequitable to 
permit exercise of the right after a lapse of time." Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S. 377,381 
(Fam. Ct. 1993). 
84. Id at380. 
85. Id at 380,382. 
86. Matter of %masS., N.YL.J. NOV. 21,1994, at B1. 
87. Peter Bienstock, attorney for the defendant, has stated that he will appeal the case to the 
Court of Appeals. See David W. Dunlap, Spenn Donor Is Awarded StMding as Girl's Father, 
N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 19,1994, at 27. The possibility that New York's highest court might review this 
case will probably propel further debate on this case. 
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dispute, from intra-community debates to the "scathing7'88 language of 
the Appellate decision and dissent, rendered apparent the cost of each 
"victory." 
The defendant's supporters have claimed the Family Court 
decision was a strong affirmation of the legitimacy of lesbian families.89 
The plaintiffs supporters have contended that the Family Court relied on 
models of binary heterosexual relationships and parenthood?o and that 
recognition of Thomas Steel's third-parent status would better reflect the 
plurality of lesbian and gay parenthood. Responding to his success at the 
Appellate level, Steel told The New York Times: "It's so satisfying after 
all these years of struggle to maintain this relationship to see a court 
recognize the diverse nature of our families and honor the different 
relationships we create."gl 
The essentialist notion that lesbian and gay communities need on 
alternative family structure reduces the viability of differing, even 
opposing, queer relationships. In this case, the adversarial nature of the 
law requires adherence to one or another competing vision of "lesbian 
and gay'' relationships. Recognition of the law's limitations in meeting 
queer needs might permit queer legal activists to avoid feuding over such 
a construct. As Justice Betty Weinberg Ellerin noted in her Appellate 
Division dissent, objective legal rules have limited application to "the 
complexity of human relationships that permeate this case and the 
millions of households that maintain alternate family life styles."92 
C. Queer Critiques 
The "but-for" queer emphasis in these cases ignores or excludes 
many queer legal needs. Crenshaw's analysis of how black women are 
88. Arthur S. Leonard, Sharply Divided NY Appellate Court Grants Sperm Donor's 
Petition for Filiation; Orders New Hearing on Visitation, December 1994 LESBIANIGAY L. NOTES 
142,144. 
89. "In Thomas S. v. Robin Y., a family law court, for the first time in history, gave its 
fullest, most affirming respect to a family consisting of a lesbian couple and their two daughters." 
PAULA E ~ R I C K ,  June 1993 LEITERS TO 'IHE LESBWGAY L. NOTES 1. The case continues to 
draw attention on appeal. See Adams, supra note 83. 
90. "[Als a feminist and activist for gay and lesbian rights, I find the court's decisions in 
Steel v. Young to be a setback in the support of alternative family structures created by gay and 
lesbian families." Ann Philbin, LEITERS TOTHE LESBIANIGAY L. NOTES, June 1993, at 3-4. 
91. David W. Dunlap, Sperm Donor Is Awarded Standing as Girl's Father, N.Y. TIMES 
Nov. 19,1994, at 27. 
92. Matter of T h o r n  S., N.Y.L.J. Nov. 21, 1994, at B1, B2 (dissent). 
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excluded by this identity serves as a model for how various queer 
communities are treated by the law in general, and by these cases in 
particular. "If black women cannot conclusively say that 'but for' their 
race or 'but for' their gender they would be treated differently, they are 
not invited to climb through the hatch but told to wait in the unprotected 
margin until they can be absorbed into the broader, protected categories 
of race and sex."93 Similarly, under the facts and holdings of these cases, 
poor, sexually subversive and other more marginalized queers are told to 
wait until the discrimination against them fits into a discrete category. In 
this manner, the courts create rules from these facts that reflect a lifestyle 
which many queers cannot or do not wish to live. 
Viewing these cases as unproblematic victories presumes lesbian 
and gay identity to be fixed. In this section, I will analyze the cases from 
the perspectives of various queer communities excluded by social 
position or subversive identity. After describing the first and broadest 
exclusion relating to class, I will examine limits relating to queers of 
color, and sexual and gender subversives.94 I will thus explore several 
limitations from different queer perspectives:95 1) how the facts in these 
cases may restrict future application, 2) how the fruits of legal victory are 
inaccessible to some queers, and 3) how some queers may not want 
access to the legal institutions of marriage and family. 
1. Poor Queers 
As in other areas of the law,96 poor people face a great deal of 
exclusion in lesbian and gay rights litigation. In Braschi, the Court of 
Appeals indicated financial interdependence to be one criterion for its 
determination that the couple merited rent control protection. To 
determine financial commitment, the court examined several aspects of 
the lives of the BlanchardBraschi couple. They shared safe deposit 
boxes, joint savings and checking accounts, joint credit cards, and even 
93. Crenshaw, supra note23, at 152. 
94. While I address these categories, the broadness of the queer continuum opens up many 
possible queer critiques of the law or these cases. See, e.g., Harper, supra note 15. 
95. As a white, middle-class gay man, I cannot speak from a position of classist or racist 
subordination. Subverting norms of sexual practice and gender performance, as well as my 
activism and studies constitute the principal experience which grounds this article's critique. 
96. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 1 U.S. 1 (1973) (finding that 
poor residents of San Antonio did not have an equal protection claim for school funding because, 
"the 'poor' cannot be identified or defined in customary equal protection terms. . . ." Id at 19. 
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made rent payments together.97 Although lesbian and gay relationships 
have no legal recognition per se, Blanchard established a strong legal 
relationship by executing a power of attorney in Braschi's favor and 
naming him as the beneficiary of his life insurance, and the primary 
legatee and co-executor of his estate.98 Ruthann Robson notes that 
"[slome commentaries on Braschi celebrate its expansive generosity and 
its recognition of reality. Yet the reality of most lesbians is that they do 
not live in Braschi-like comfort with a rent controlled apartment on the 
Upper East Side, sharing the keys to their safe deposit boxes.. ."99 
Women's generally lower pay and the double burden lesbian couples face 
in this respectloo emphasize the veracity of this assertion. 
However, the lesbians of Evan and Thomas S. v. Robin Y. escape 
the double-bind of lesbian poverty. Their class positions figure quite 
prominently in both trial level decisions. Surrogate Preminger 
pronounced the class position of Evan's mothers in the fist paragraph of 
facts: "Diane, age 39, is an Assistant Professor of Pediatrics and an 
attending physician at a respected teaching hospital. Valerie, age 40, 
holds a Ph.D. in developmental psychology and teaches at a highly 
regarded private school."l0l The importance of finances in the 
application of the best interest test may limit the breadth of this victory. 
An important reason for granting the adoption was that Evan would 
receive inheritance and medical and educational benefits from Diane and 
her family. Poor queers might not satisfy a court relying on such material 
comfort to grant the adoption. 
Young and Russo are, according to the opinion, in a similarly 
grand financial position. Professionally, both mothers as well as the 
sperm donor are successful attomeys.102 Young owns and manages the 
Manhattan apartment building in which her family lives,l03 and the 
couple jointly owns a home in upstate New York. Both daughters, Ry 
97. Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 543 N.E.2d 49,55 (N.Y. 1989). 
98. Id 
99. Ruthann Robson, Resisting the Family: Repositioning Lesbians in Legal Theory, SIGNS 
19:4 at 115,126 (1994). 
100. "On the whole [lesbians] are poorer than gay men and have less choice in terms of work 
and location. . ." MANUEL CASIEUS, supra note 24, at 140. For an anti-classist examination of 
lesbian legal issues, see generally Ruthann Robson, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW (1992), supra note 35, the 
ground breaking book of lesbian legal theory and issues. 
101. In the Matter of the Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997,998 (1992). 
102. 599 N.Y.S. at 378. 
103. Id. at 379. 
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and Cade, attend private school (not an inexpensive undertaking in 
Manhattan, even if paid for by Russo's mother).'@ Comfortable 
financial situations clearly ground these three cases, which, at least in 
Evan and Thomas S., involve highly educated professionals. 
These cases' facts and holdings exclude poor queers in other 
ways. Most fundamentally, litigation requires financial resources. In 
Evan, the mothers chose to spend the money needed to formalize her 
adoption. While in Brhchi, M.A.B., and Thomas S., the victorious 
lesbian or gay parties did not commence the action, they had the means to 
hire a lawyer to defend their cases successfully. Poor queers most likely 
could not even afford to defend against Thomas S., much less to succeed 
in part by the graces of Manhattan property, professional privilege, and 
private education. Beyond litigation itself, poor queers generally do not 
have the money to share the financial securities that might serve as 
evidence in a proceeding following Braschi's rule. Many queers are not 
professionals, as are Young, Valerie and Diane. Few queers have 
mothers who could pay the Manhattan private school tuition for their 
children. And even fewer queers have the employment benefits that 
Surrogate Prerninger cites in permitting Diane to adopt. 
The poverty of the plaintiff in White v. Thompson105 exposes the 
privilege of the victors in the New York cases. Ms. White lost custody of 
her children to her ex-husband's parents because she was "unfit, morally 
and otherwise . . . "106 to raise the children. She and her lover, Phyllis 
Hasberger, lived together in a trailer with their children.107 Because 
White received no child support from her alcoholic ex-husband, she 
worked late hours in a convenience store to support her children, leaving 
the children unsupervised in the morning while she slept.108 Had she 
sufficient resources, she would have been able to pay for a more effective 
defense and a baby-sitter to prevent accusations of "neglect." Although 
the rules in Braschi, Evan, and Thomas S. do not specifically require 
wealth, class may play a role in interpreting these rules, excluding many 
queers. Viewing these cases as unproblematic victories furthers class 
104. Id 
105. 569 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1990). While this is not a New York case, its juxtaposition 
against the other New York cases points out how a poor lesbian might be treated, even in New 
York. 
106. Id at 1184. 
107. Id at 1181. 
108. Id at 1183. 
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hierarchies within queer communities by ignoring the juridical classism 
poor queers face. 
2. Queers of Color 
Queers of color are not mentioned in the cases, with Miguel 
Braschi the only possible exception, his first name suggesting a possible 
Latino heritage. Although race doesn't appear as explicitly relevant in 
these decisions, its absence indicates a notion of universality that implies 
whiteness. What is relevant is that the facts of these cases indicate 
technologies and living situations which, because of economic and social 
racism and cultural differences, are not often available to many people of 
color.'09 Given the cultural contingency of relationships, responding to 
Black and Latino heterosexual family structures110 might lead queers of 
color to relationship structures different from those of white queers. 
According to Crenshaw, the use of race-objective tones often indicates an 
exclusion of people of color. "The authoritative universal voice [is] 
usually white male subjectivity masquerading as non-racial, non- 
gendered objectivity . . . ."I1 One of the effects of "race-neutral" lesbian 
and gay identities and legal needs is the construction of "lesbians and 
gays" as white.l12 The intersection of race and sexuality also does not 
appear in these cases. Although this dichotomy may not have been 
intended by the litigators or their clients, these cases may further distance 
queers of color from queer politics. Essex Hemphill criticizes white gay 
racism: 
It has not fully dawned on white gay men that racist 
conditioning has rendered many of them no different from 
109. The Kerner Commission, appointed by President Johnson after the 1967 riots, 
concluded that African-Americans were "confronted with a political system unresponsive to their 
demands [and] controlled by white people." NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, 
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CML DISORDERS 5,49 (1968), 
cited in Mary A. Inman C.P.R. (Change Through Proportional Representation): Resuscitating a 
Federal Electoral System, 141 U .  PA. L. REV. 1991 pp. 1394.  
1 10. For discussion of Black families, see Eleanor Holmes Norton, Restoring the Traditional 
BIack Family, N.Y. m, June 2, 1985, Sec. 6 at 43; for commentary on gender in Latino 
families, see Harold C. Schonberg, Hispanic Impact on the Arts: Mysticism to Machismo, N.Y. 
W, Dec. 13,1981, Sec. 2 at 1. 
1 1 1. Crenshaw, supra note 23, at 154. 
112. See, e.g., Margaret Cerullo, Multi/eueer/Culture, VOL. 24 NO. 4 RADICAL AMERICA 32. 
(Stating, in discussion of affirmative action for lesbian and gay people "'[GIayAesbian' is being 
opposed to race, and implicitly therefore being constructed as white." Id. 
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their heterosexual brothers in the eyes of Black gays and 
lesbians. Coming out of the closet to confront sexual 
oppression has not necessarily given white males the 
motivation or insight to transcend their racist 
conditioning. This failure (or reluctance) to transcend is 
costing the gay and lesbian community the opportunity to 
become a powerful force for creating real social changes 
that reach beyond issues of sexuality. It has fostered 
much of the distrust that permeates the relations between 
the Black and white communities. And finally, it erodes 
the possibility of forming meaningful, powerful 
coalitions.113 
The whiteness of these cases and of much lesbian and gay legal 
work furthers the racism within our communities. And, as Hemphill 
points out, the exclusion of Black queers and other queers of color114 
prevents the forming of coalitions which might create significant social 
change. 
3. Sexual Subversives 
Yes, I am a Free Lover . . . I have an inalienable, 
constitutional, and natural right to love whom I may, . . . 
to change that love every day iflplease, . . . and it is your 
duty not only to accord [my right], but, as a community 
to see that I am protected in it.115 
Victoria Woodhull, 187 1 
These cases extend some heterosexual privilege to lesbians and 
gays, excluding the goals of sexually subversive queers. While people of 
113. HEMP= supra note 45, at 39-40. 
114. Perry Watkins, a Black gay former b y  sergeant, stated, "Racism within the gay 
community is a big problem. The primary reason is that we are a direct reflection of the society 
from which we come, which is controlled by white males. When the gay community was formed 
and became political, the leaders were white men, and they brought their prejudices with them.'' 
Williams, supra note 21, at Al. 
115. Victoria Woodhull, A Speech on the Principles of Social Freedom, Delivered in New 
York City, Nov. 20, 1871, and Boston, Jan. 3, 1872 at 23-24, cited in Ellen Carol DuBois, 
Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman Smage,  and the United States 
Constifzuion, 1820-1878, in 'I& CON.~~IUTION AND AMnumN LE @avid Thelen ed.) at 176, 
196. 
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color and poor queers may be excluded from the benefits of these cases, 
sexually subversive queers1l6 would begin with a different set of goals, 
based on non-heterocentric relationships. 
Sexual subversives are those who explore and celebrate their 
sexualities. In addition to those who do not choose lengthy relationships, 
monogamy, or marriage for various reasons, many queers explore radical 
forms of sexuality: public sex (parks, tearooms, "adult bookstores," 
backrooms), anonymous sex, group sex, promiscuity, sado-masochism, 
and role-playing.ll7 Michel Foucault described queer sexual liberation: 
"[A] whole new art of sexual practice develops which tries to explore all 
the internal possibilities of sexual conduct. You find emerging in places 
like San Francisco and New York what might be called laboratories of 
sexual experimentation."ll8 Many queers do not have or seek to have 
lengthy relationships. Some queers do not even couple, or do so in ways 
which would be unrecognizable to these courts. Although some queer 
couples are monogamous, many view monogamy as a fundamental 
obstacle to sexual liberation. "Gay male promiscuity should be seen . . . 
as a positive model of how sexual pleasures might be pursued by and 
granted to everyone if those pleasures were not confined within the 
narrow limits of institutionalized sexuality."llg These courts attempt to 
determine the presence of emotional ties by using indicia presupposing a 
116. For a ground-breaking exploration of feminist and other radical theories of sexuality, 
see Gayle S. Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in 
PLEA~uRE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY (Carol S. Vance ed., 1984), reprinted in 
THELESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER, supra note 27 at 3. 
117. In discussing sexual subversives, I do not intend to conflate the vast differences among 
those who might subvert sexual norms. Most notably, lesbian experience of sexual subversion 
differs from gay experience in innumerable ways. See 4, J U D ~  BUILER, Critically Queer, in 
BODIES THAT MATIER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMlTS OF "SEX" 223 (1993) ('The relation between 
sexual practice and gender is surely not a structurally determined one, but the destabilizing of the 
heterosexual presumption of that very structuralism still requires a way to think of the two in a 
dynamic relation to one another.") Id. at 239. However useful such an exploration would prove, it 
is beyond the scope of this Essay. 
118. MICHELFOUCAULT, FOUCAULTLIVE 225 (Sylvkre Lotringer ed. & John Johnston trans., 
1989). 
119. Douglas Crimp, How to Have Promiscuity in an Epidemic in AIDS: CULTURAL 
ANALYSIS, CULTURALAC~VJSM 237,253 (Crimp ed., 1988). 
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heterosexually structured relationship.120 In so doing, they exclude 
queers who choose alternative structures. 
Three aspects of coupling are addressed in these cases: 
exclusivity, longevity, and similarity to a marital lifestyle. They also look 
at the parents' sexuality to determine the quality of their parenthood. I 
will clarify the language of the courts regarding these issues before 
exploring the impact on sexual subversives. 
a. Monogamy 
Courts rely on monogamy as the strongest and most unique 
indicator of stability. In all four decisions, the courts refer to the duration 
of the relationship. Both lesbian couples were together fourteen years at 
the time of the respective decisions.121 The BraschiBlanchard couple 
had been together for ten years,l22 and the R.B. couple for eight years.123 
Although the criteria in Braschi are to be regarded as but part of a totality, 
this totality requires an assimilationist sexual behavior of lesbians and 
gays, one which compromises the lesbian and gay challenge to 
established sexual and romantic structures. 
In Braschi, M.A.B., and Thomas S., the "exclusivity," or 
monogamy, of the relationship is given a central role in demonstrating 
commitment.124 The Braschi court establishes exclusivity as a criteria to 
test a relationship for rent control protection.125 "Exclusivity" also 
appeared to motivate the Family Court's decision to respect the validity 
of Young's and Russo's relationship. "Respondent Robin Y[oung] and 
Sandra R[usso] met in 1979. They established and have maintained to 
this day an exclusive lesbian relati~nship."~~~ Two of the decisions go so 
far as to refer to the couples in terms of marriage: "They (Braschi and 
Blanchard) regarded one another, and were regarded by friends and 
120. But see Picon v. O.D.C. Assocs., No. 22894186 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 28, 1991), in which "the 
court ruled that the s u ~ v i n g  partner's 'affair' with another man did not invalidate his claim to the 
rent controlled apartment of his deceased lover." RUBENSTEIN, supra note 14, at 458. 
121. In the Matter of the Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997,998 (1992); Thomas S. v. 
RobinY., 599 N.Y.S.2d 377,377 (Fam. Ct. 1993). 
122. Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 543 N.E.2d 49,55 (N.Y. 1989). 
123. M.A.B. v. RB., 510N.Y.S. 960,963 (1986). 
124. Id; Evan, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 377. 
125. Bruschi, 543 N.E.2d at 55. 
126. Thomas S., 599 N.Y.S.2d at 377. The court's prudishly vague language could mean that 
Robin Young and Sandra Russo are either monogamous or that they only have sex with lesbians. 
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family, as spouses";l27 "For Evan, they are a marital relationship at its 
nurturing supportive best, and they seek second-parent adoption for the 
same reasons of stability and recognition as any couple might."l28 
From the perspective of the "but-for" queers who might want to 
benefit from rent control protection, or other social privileges accorded to 
married heterosexuals, these cases present stricter standards than those 
faced by heterosexuals. A widow(er) of a rent control tenant would not 
have to prove monogamy or intermingled finances to keep the apartment 
under rent control laws.129 Heterosexual fathers do not have to be 
"discreet"130 enough to survive the nexus test in order to gain custody. 
Thus, even for those queers who do seek marriage and family rights 
similar to heterosexuals,l31 Braschi and M.A.B. set up rules which require 
a far higher standard for lesbians and gays than exists for 
heterosexuals.132 
b. Marriage 
The ever-lurking paradigm of marriage in these cases cannot be 
overlooked.133 Paula Ettelbrick writes: "Steeped in a patriarchal system 
127. 543 N.E.2d at 55. 
128. 583 N.Y.S.2d at 999. 
129. See John C. v. Martha A, 592 N.Y.S.2d 229, 231 ("Petitioner therefore claims that. . . 
the married spouse of any named tenant . . must prove 'emotional and financial interdependence' 
in order to assert rights in the premises. The Court of Appeals never held that an inquiry into the 
sexual or financial relationship of legally married persons is either required or appropriate in this 
context."). 
130. 510 N.Y.S.2d at 963. 
131. See, e.g., Lisa Zimmer, Family, Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 12 CARDOW L. 
REV. 681. (Arguing that lesbians and gays should have marriage rights). 
132. This critique was posited by a letter writer to the New York Times shortly after the 
publication of the decision. 'This test, to which many lesbian, gay, and unmarried heterosexual 
relationships do not conform, is the weakness of the decision. The requirement that all unmarried 
couples meet the Braschi test, modeled after traditional marriage, will open the door for courts to 
challenge the validity of relationships case by case. By contrast, it confers benefits on married 
heterosexual couples, whether or not they would meet the test." Victoria C. Metaxas, N.Y. TnvIEs, 
Jul. 18,1989, at ,420. 
133. Two published symposia provide an excellent range of opinions in the marriage debate: 
The Family in the 1990's: An Exploration of Lesbian and Gay Rights 1 LAW & SEXUM: A 
REV. OF LESBIAN AND GAY LEGAL ISSUES 1-98 (1991): Harlon L. Dalton, Refections on the 
Lesbian and Gay Marriage Debate, 1 LAW & SWALITY 1 (1991); Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law. 
and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9 (1991); Nitya Duclos, Some Complicating 
Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, 1 LAW & SEXUAUTY 31 (1991); Mary C. Dunlap The Lesbian 
and Gay Marriage Debate: A Microcosm of Our Hopes and Troubles in the Nineties, 1 LAW & 
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that looks to ownership, property, and dominance of men over women as 
its basis, the institution of marriage has long been the focus of radical 
feminist revulsion."l34 In addition to the significant role feminism plays 
in queer communities, 135 others argue that marriage is assimilationist, 
and that queers should avoid assimilation. "Advocating gay and lesbian 
marriage . . . will . . . require a rhetorical strategy that emphasizes 
similarities between our relationships and heterosexual marriages, values 
long-term monogamous couples above all other relationships, and denies 
the potential of lesbian and gay marriage to transform the gendered nature 
of marriage for all people."l36 Many queers accept some critique of 
marriage, be it feminist or anti-assimilationist, and would not want to take 
part in any such institution, nor its accompanying ''family values." 
However, some queers outside the sexual normality of traditional 
marriage might nonetheless wish to take advantage of the economic and 
social benefits.137 Indeed, one of the strongest arguments in favor of 
lesbian and gay marriage is that same sex marriages will transform the 
conservative, gendered nature of the institution.138 
c. Family 
Sexually subversive practices would undoubtedly violate the 
court's interpretation of "best interests" and qualify under the nexus test 
as "adversely affecting the child." The language of M.A.B. indicates that 
SEXUAU~Y 63 (1991); Sexual Orientation and the Law 79 U. VA. 1419, 1550; William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Ser Marriage 79 VA. L. REV. 1419 (1993); Milton C. Regan, Jr., 
Reason, Tradition, and Family Law: A Comment on Social Constructionism 79 VA. L. REV. 1515 
(1993); Nancy D. Polikoff, Will We Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian 
Marriage Will Not " D h t l e  the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage, '" 79 VA. L. REV. 
1549 (1993). 
134. Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, 
at 9 in Rvsmm, supra note 18, at 401. 
135. But c$, ~ ~ ~ A R ~ L Y N  FR- supra note 45. For a psychoanalytic approach to the 
rdationship between gay men and feminism, see CRAIG OWENS, Outlaws: Gay Men in Feminism, 
in MENINFEMINISM 219 (Alice Jardine, Paul Smith, eds. 1987). 
136. Polikoff, supra note 133, at 1549. Paula Ettelbrick argues: 'The goals of lesbian and 
gay liberation must simply be broader than the right to marry. Gay and lesbian maniages may 
minimally transform the institution of marriage by diluting its traditional patriarchal dynamic, but 
they will not transform society." 
137. For a pro-maniage response to the above arguments, see generally Evan Wolfson, 
Crossing the 77zreshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men, and the Intra- 
Community Critique, forthcoming in N.Y.U. REV. LAW & SOC. CHANGE (1994). 
138. See generally Hunter, supra note 133. 
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even the slightest expression of overt homosexual behavior would not be 
viewed favorably by the court.139 Susie Bright, a radical lesbian sex 
activist and writer,l40 would be unable to prove to the courts that her open 
lesbian sexuality has no "adverse effect" on her children. No family court 
in the face of a paternity claim would respect her lesbian motherhood. 
Sexual subversives would be excluded from access to the rights obtained 
in these cases. More important is that the liberation embodied in their 
sexual practices directly challenges the privilege accorded to the concept 
of "family rights."I4l One commentator criticizes the Family Court's 
holding in Thomas S. v. Robin Y. as "a decision that strikes a blow against 
alternative family structures. . . . Lesbians, and anyone in a non- 
traditional family should be wary of the subtext: lesbian parents have 
rights only to the extent that their relationship exactly duplicates the 
traditional heterosexual two-parent model-two kids, two parents, living 
together, one works, one stays home, private school, dog and all."142 
Thus, queers are wary of the family's power to domesticate the marginal 
parts of their lives. Ruthann Robson theorizes this critique, "klesbian 
resistance to the family should become more elemental: resistance to 
being either included or excluded, resistance to the power of the category 
of family within legal theory and legal practice to define, redefine, 
sanction, and appropriate lesbian existence."l43 
Many queers practice promiscuity as sexual revolution, and for 
them the criteria of longevity, exclusivity, and marital reputation seem 
139. While in M.A.B., the court enforces the secrecy of homosexuality, in Braschi, the court 
requires such openness, citing their families', superintendent's and doormen's knowledge of their 
relationship as evidence of their being a couple. While some closeted persons could not provide 
such proof, the New York County Civil Court found, in a rent-control tenancy inheritance case, that 
the couple's not being open with their families did not preclude inheritance. Lerad Realty Co. v. 
Reynolds, discussed in October 1990 LESBIAN~GAY L. NOTES 63, noted in R m w m ,  supra note 
13. 
140. See SUSE BRIGHT, SUSE SEXPERT'S LESBIAN SEX WORLD (1990); SUSE BRIGHT'S 
SEXUALREAUTX A VIRTUAL SEX-WORLD READER (1992). 
141. Larry Kramer gave voice to this dichotomy in The Normal Heart: ". . . m h e  gay 
leaders who created this sexual liberation philosophy in first place have been the death of us. 
Mickey, why didn't you guys fight for the right to get married instead of the right to legitimize 
promiscuity?" LARRY KRAMER, 'I% NORMAL HEART 85 (1985). 
142. Nanci L. Clarence, June 1993 LE~TERSTOTHELESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES 3-4. 
143. Ruthann Robson, Resisting the Family, supra note 99, at 116. Robson specifies her 
vision of resistance: "The formulation of new categories in lieu of 'the family' could be an 
important form of resistance, and could allow us to reconceptualize ourselves and our relationships 
in as yet unimaginable ways, while honoring our complex relationships rooted in our varying racial, 
ethnic, religious, and economic identities." Id. at 132. 
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antediluvian. While this dichotomy is obviously not quite absolute, the 
legal goals of sexual liberationists would look very different from those of 
Evan, Thomas S. and M.A.B. While BraschiBlanchard, R.B. and his 
lover, Young/Russo, and DianeNalerie should be permitted to form 
relationships as they wish, many queers do not wish to engage in such 
long-term relationships. 
Looking beyond heterosexual constructs, the law ~ could better 
respond to sexually subversive queer needs. The consideration of 
commitment and stability, necessary concepts for rent control and 
parenting, might, for example, include three-partner and other 
relationships. A new vision of parenting might also permit further 
recognition of queer farnilie~.l~ It also might ignore experimental 
sexualities, promiscuity, and other forms of sexual liberation when they 
have little bearing on a person's qualifications for parenting or tenancy 
inheritance. 
4. Gender Subversives 
Subversive gender roles also seem excluded by the language of 
these cases. Fem queer boys, butch dykes, transvestites, drag queens, and 
transsexuals all subvert compulsory heterosexual roles.145 The few 
descriptions in these cases indicate that the parties perfam traditional 
gender roles. The application of the nexus test in both M.A.B. and Evan 
indicates that traditional gender performance is a requirement for a 
favorable decision. In M.A.B. v. R.B., the first characteristic the court 
used to weigh this test was the father's "straight-acting7' behavior: "The 
father's behavior has been discreet, not flamboyant."l46 To engage in the 
144. See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered 
Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 (1993); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child 
Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Nee& of Children in Lesbian- 
Mother and Other Nontraditiona~ Families, 78 GEO. LJ. 459 (1990). For an excellent enunciation 
of a childcentered approach to visitation, see In the Matter of Allison D. v. Virginia M., 572 
N.E.2d 27 (1991) (Kaye, J., dissenting). 
145. In articulating some of the issues of "gender benders," I do not mean to conflate 
homosexuality with transvestitism or transsexuality. See generally Marc A. Fajer, supra note 32 
(arguing that the myth that lesbian and gay people are automatically cross-gendered harms the 
effort for legal protection for lesbian and gay rights); MARJORIE GARBER, Breaking the Code, in 
V m  INIERESTS 128 (1992) (exploring the issues around the ''category crisis" of gayLesbian 
identity and transvestitism); Jmm B m ,  GENDERTROUBLE: F MINISM AND THE SUBVERSION F 
ID- (1990) (Ekploring the feminist challenge to fixed gender identities). 
146. M.A.B. v. RB., 510N.Y.S.2d 960,963 (1986). 
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tactic used by the Braschi court, Webster's defines "flamboyant" as 
"marked by or given to strikingly elaborate, ornate, or colorhl display or 
behavior."l47 Qualifying as "discreet," R.B. might be categorized by 
some as "straight-acting." Indeed, the court refers several times to R.B.'s 
"discreet" expression of homosexuality: R.B. does not "flaunt his 
homosexuality,"~48 and he and his partner "never embrace or touch in 
front of the children."149 The one time they were caught in bed, the child 
saw both men in pajamas.150 But in a community where even the most 
muscular of men may be "given to colorful display," it might be difficult 
for many fern queer boys and butch dykes to satisfy the nexus test. The 
positive reception of traditional gender performance by these courts 
indicates that nontraditional gender identities would fail the best interests 
and nexus tests. Regardless of access, many queers believe that gender 
performance should not be restricted by biology, and that such gender 
subversion is a necessary component of their queer identity.151 
Thus, these cases, in failing to meet the needs or follow the goals 
of various queer communities, cannot be considered clear victories. The 
limitations of these victories parallel inequalities within the lesbian and 
gay community. Queer intersectionality and the queer continuum 
together as a framework might surpass these divisions which limit the 
revolutionary potential of queer identity. 
[Gliven the cultural complexity of heterosexual law, there 
is more than one way of breaking it. 
147. WEESTER'S NINIH NEW COLLW~IATEDIC~ONARY at 469 (1987). 
148. M.A.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d at 966. See Mark A. Fajer, supra note 31, at 571-87, for a richer 
exploration of the meaning of flaunting. 
149. M.A.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d at 966. 
150. Id. Fortunately, I doubt many heterosexuals would meet this "discreet" standard. 
151. See CAROLYN G. HEILBRUN, TOWARD A RECOGN~ON OF ANDROGYNY ix. (1973) 
("[Olur future salvation lies in a movement away from sexual polarization and the prison of gender 
toward a world in which individual roles and the modes of personal behavior can be freely 
chosen"). See ako INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TRANSGENDER LAW AND E M P L o ~  
POLICY, INC., THE I N ~ A T I O N A L  BIU OF GENDER IGHTS (August 20,1994) (on file with author) 
(stating: "[Alll human beings shall have the right to define their own gender identity, regardless of 
chromosomal sex, genitalia, assigned birth sex, or initial gender role"). 
152. Calhoun, supra note 16, at 1860. 
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The purpose of establishing the various limitations of these 
"victories" was not only to criticize them, but to extract lessons that may 
move queer perspectives toward a more self-conscious relationship with 
the law. The Braschi test, as well as the nexus test, empower only "but- 
for" queers with the ability to survive these tests. While the best interests 
test is more flexible in nature and application, it is nonetheless applied in 
a manner which precludes the success of many queer litigants. Even 
beyond the rules, the construction of lesbian and gay identity in these 
cases can inform the relationship of queer communities with the law. In 
this section, I will briefly explore the possible roles litigation may play in 
queer movements. As I have demonstrated in the above critique, 
litigation can be essentialize and marginalize queers. Based on this 
critique, I would like to situate litigation within political action. Because 
of the problems posed by litigation, and because most in our movements 
are not lawyers, litigation should not be the central focus for change. 
Rather a "plurality of resistances"l53 which encompasses three visions of 
the relation between queer communities and the law, would more 
accurately serve the queer continuum. 
Progressive movements have shown a tendency to rely on law 
reform and litigation generally as the principal vehicle for change.154 
However, it is clear that pinning our hopes on litigation will not provide 
broad change on queer issues. Indeed, as these cases show, the danger in 
allowing litigation to defme our political goals is the further division of 
our community into "but-for" queers and intersectional queers. 
Queer intersectionality and the queer continuum call not for a 
unitary strategy centered on litigation but for a plurality of resistances: 
There is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of 
revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the 
153. Foucault, supra note 16, at 95-96. 
154. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) formed part of a series of race 
discrimination cases of increasingly broader scope, and has inspired various movements to attempt 
similar strategies. See, e.g., Jack Greenberg, Litigation for Social Change: Methodr, Limits, and 
Role in Democracy, 29 REC. ASS'N B. N.Y. 320,331 (1974) ("Brown and the cases preceding it are 
sometimes looked upon as a paradigm of law making in the courts and probably they have been the 
principle inspiration to others who seek change through litigation.") and Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: 
The Forms of Jusrice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1-3 (1978) C1[S1tructural reform has its roots in the Warren 
Court era and the extraordinaty effort to &anslate the rule of Brown v. Board of Education into 
practice."), noted in Susan P. Stunn, supra note 3, at 2 n.2. It is beyond the scope of this essay to 
address the efficacy of this and other strategies for queer people. 
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revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, 
each of them a special case; resistances that are possible, 
necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, 
savage, solitary, concerted rampant, or violent; still others 
that are quick to compromise, interested or sacrificial; by 
definition, they can only exist in the strategic field of 
power relations.155 
Although litigation does not, as these cases demonstrate, mirror the 
breadth of queer communities, it is a tactic which may form part of the 
plurality of resistances. Other resistances include the mere commission of 
subversive acts that violate compulsory heterosexuality, such as public 
sex or multiple parenting. And, finally, the time-honored taking to the 
streets serves as a major form of resistance. 
Within the plurality of resistances there are three identifiable 
views of litigation's role in queer movements: continuing litigation 
strategies; working for the transformation of legal institutions, and 
looking for alternatives to litigation. These perspectives correspond to 
three theories of law: law as change, as subversion and as co-optation. 
A. Change 
The first perspective is that despite the exclusions in these cases, 
legal reform is a viable route for queer cornrnunities.156 This perspective 
sees working within the law as essential for progress. This liberal faith in 
the fairness of the law would seek to eradicate discrimination through 
applying the law in an objective, non-discriminatory fashion. Justice 
155. FOUCAULT, supra note 16, at 95-96. Foucault's ground breaking work on sexuality and 
on social constructionism contributes immensely to theories of resistance. Bur cf:, RICHARD Mom, 
The Thing of It Is: Some Problems with Modek for the Social Construction of Homosexuality, in 
GAY IDEAS: OUTING AND OTHER CONIROVERSIES 221 (1992), in which Mohr, conflating various 
forms of critical theory, argues against notions of social construction of "gay" identity. Mohr 
further argues that without a liberal humanist notion of gay identity, there can be no concept of 
oppression, and thus no claim that rights have been violated. Id. at 4-5. Although I disagree with 
his exclusively liberal project, his exploration of liberalist philosophy and "gay" rights provides 
some clear arguments that I believe rhetorically useful. See RICHARD MOHR, GAYS/JUS~CE (1988). 
156. But cf: BRUCE BAWER, A PLACE AT THE TABLE: THE GAY INDIVIDUAL IN AMEFUCAN 
SOCIEIY (1993) (arguing that lesbian and gay people should emphasize assimilationist aspects of 
the community to attain rights: "Rather than concentrate on correcting the grotesque public image 
of gay life and on working to enable gays to live responsibly under the protection of the law, many 
radical gay activists perpetuate at every turn the widespread view of homosexuals as freaks, 
outlaws, sex addicts, and sexual exhibitionists.") Id at 28-29. 
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Ellerin stated in The Matter of 27zomas S.: "If  the child's best interests 
are to be the touchstone of the analysis, the attempts by the parties to 
argue the equities of their own respective personal positions are not 
germane."l57 
Especially in family law situations, individuals will bring cases 
according to their personal needs, even when they conflict with political 
goals, rendering legal strategizing a far more complex endeavor.158 Yet 
the pursuit of political strategies could not deny individuals recourse to 
the law. Local family law cases might not attract the attention of the most 
talented lawyers in the cornmunity,l59 especially since all local decisions 
on family matters could hardly be monitored by national groups. As 
Thomas S. v. Robin Y. demonstrates, lesbian and gay litigation might be a 
difficult path toward reform, regardless of intersectionality. 
As I argued above, litigation as a route to change is flawed in that 
some queer communities will be have to wait until broader, protected 
categories subsume their own. The choice of continuing a litigation- 
based strategy may, however, even given this critique, be a cynical but 
necessary one. Perhaps all litigation strategies are conservative in this 
manner, and to use the law, we need to engage in some exclusion to 
accomplish the legitimization of our communities. 
To speed the legal legitimization of other queers through broader 
categories queer legal activists might attempt a successful application of 
these precedent-setting cases to different queer issues.160 Queer 
157. Matter of Thomas S., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 21,1994, at B1, B2 (Ellerin, J., dissenting). 
158. Interview with Susan P. Sturm, Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia, March 4,1994. 
159. The Sharon Bottoms case is a good example of a&s problems affecting the national 
movement Ms. Bottoms lost custody to her mother primarily based on her being a lesbian. The 
only point at which national counsel came into the case was after the trial judge's decision was 
rendered, leaving Ms. Bottoms a difficult appeal as her only recourse. See, e.g., B. Drummond 
Ayres, Jr., Gay Woman Loses Custody of Her Son to Her Mother, N.Y. m, Sept. 8, 1993, at 
A16. 
160. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 3 ("Political conservatism does not fully account for the 
decline of the test case model of law reform [in corrections litigation]. To some extent, the decline 
in the model's significance is a natural development in the life cycle of social change and 
litigation."). Similarly, in lesbian and gay rights litigation, the movement now might be towatd 
establishing precedent, later to be extended, at which time the test case model would decline in 
importance. However, Braschrs precedential value is limited, as demonstrated by the New York 
Court of Appeals when it refused to apply Braschi to a visitation rights case in In the Matter of 
Allison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991). See also Kevin Sack, Lesbian Loses a 
Ruling on Parent's Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,1991, atB1. Paula Ettelbrick, who argued the case 
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communities with access to legal services could provide them for those 
who do not.161 Increased communication among queer legal groups and 
other queer groups might also contribute to effective reform. Another 
possibility for reform is through legislation. Although legislatures have 
been slow to approve lesbian and gay rights measures, political 
empowerment through voting might permit queer communities to achieve 
legislative change.162 Much contemporary debate concerns the balancing 
of demands for heterosexual privilege such as marriage with the feminist 
and sexual subversive ethics. Prioritization of marriage rights might be 
tactically wise and even necessary, but an informed choice requires overt 
awareness of the costs. Thus, while a strategy centered around litigation 
will invariably limit and exclude, it may be a necessary choice which can 
be adjusted to better meet the legal needs of all queer communities. 
B. Subversion 
The second perspective of the law centers on the potential for 
queers to subvert the legal institutions which exclude us through the law. 
The trajectory of such a transformation might be: exclusion > litigation > 
inclusion > transformation = subversion. By transforming legal 
institutions fiom inside them, queers might be able to subvert legal 
hierarchies. Nan Hunter puts forth this argument regarding marriage: 
"What is most unsettling to the status quo about the legalization of lesbian 
and gay marriage is its potential to expose and denaturalize the historical 
construction of gender at the heart of marriage . . . p]he impact [of 
lesbian and gay marriage] will be to dismantle the legal structure of 
before the Court of Appeals, commented: "It's a fairly major setback for the gay and lesbian rights 
movement because it says that society does not recognize our relationships." Id "Ettelbrick . . . 
said lesbians placed particular significance on the decision because there are, by her organization's 
estimate, about 10,000 children in the United States being reared by lesbians who conceived 
through donor insemination." Id For more discussion of this case, see Leonard G. Florescue, A 
Trio of Children's Rights Cases, N.Y.L.J., June 5 ,  1991, at 3; Gary Spencer, Mother's Lesbian 
Parmer Denied Visitation Rights, N.Y.L.J., May 3,1991, at 1. 
161. One example of such an effort is the LeGal clinic, sponsored by the Lesbian and Gay 
Law Association of Greater New York, which provides free legal advice weekly at the Lesbian and 
Gay Community Center in New York. 
162. I explore lesbian and gay voting rights in my forthcoming article, Geographically 
Sexual?: Representing Lesbian and Gay Interests Through Propomrtlonal Representation, in which 
I argue that the geographically based districting systems divide lesbian and gay communities that 
might, under a proportional system, comprise a formidable voting bloc in a proportional system. 
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gender in every maniage."l63 Thus, once accepted within a legal 
institution considered by many queers to be oppressive, we might 
transform the oppression out of the institution. One critique of this notion 
of change is that the process of gaining access to an institution such as 
maniage might require assimilationist rhetoric that would undermine our 
subversive potential once inside the institution.164 Thus, while 
transformation remains a potential strategy, it too may pose problems for 
the achievement of the goals of queer communities. 
C. Co-optation 
The third perspective is that a litigation-centered strategy 
forestalls the possibility of more radical change for queer communities. 
This notion of co-optation relies on a vision of law as inherently 
inegalitarian: "CW]e must break free of the theoretical privilege of law 
and sovereignty, if we wish to analyze power within the concrete and 
historical framework of its operation. We must construct an analytics of 
power that no longer takes law as a model and a code."165 This vision led 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS)l66 theorists to criticize rights:l67 , 
mhe  American political system has enormous capacity to 
absorb and co-opt seemingly radical demands for change; 
to truncate the i-ange of political discourse to fit the 
boundaries of arguments for individualized, atomized 
entitlements, and ultimately, to legitimate hierarchies of 
163. Hunter, supra note 133, at 18-19. 
164. See generally, Polikoff, supra note 133. 
165. Foucault, supra note 16, at 90. 
166. For an excellent summary of the origins, accomplishments and failings of CLS, see 
Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New 
Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429. 
167. For the definitive CLS critique of right., see Mark lhshnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 
TEsAs L. REV. 1363 (1984). Notwithstanding the considerable contributions of CLS, their work is 
not unproblematic, especially from a minority perspective. Because this essay focuses on queer 
intersectional empowerment, I owe a great deal of my perspective on these issues to some Critical 
Race Theory scholars who have so effectively redirected critical energy toward minority 
perspectives. See eg., PATRICIA J.  WW, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHIS (1991); Mari J. 
Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. 
REV. 323 (1987) (arguing that CLS is an important intellectual development requiring the attention 
of people of color and that CLS can be enriched by incorporating the experience of "the bottom"); 
Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 
HARV. C.RCL L. REV. 401 (1987) (discussing Black responses to the CLS rights critique). 
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power, which rights claims can amend but never 
overturn. '68 
Indeed, these cases and their inherent limitations can be viewed as a co- 
opting of radical demands to prevent a broader subversion of the current 
heterosexist order. The court thus functions in Braschi not to create a first 
step to further rights, but to inoculate the system against the threat queer 
politics poses. Roland Barthes describes this in Mythologies: "One 
immunizes the contents of the collective imagination by means of a small 
innoculation of acknowledged evil; one thus protects it against the risk of 
generalized subversion."l69 In granting limited rights to the 
acknowledged evil of "but-for" queer relationships, the courts in these 
cases protect the legal system against the broad fundamental change of 
queer politics. Recognizing the relationships of some queers, the law 
absorbs the threat of a queer revolution of human relationships. 
Litigation also prioritizes the conformist  pa^& of the queer 
continuum. Braschi might be easily said to function in this manner. Rent 
control statutes are an interesting site for the law, to first recognize lesbian 
and gay partnerships in a context where legislative intent required the 
implementation of a very strict test to prevent widespread abuse. The use 
of such a strict test to first recognize lesbian and gay couples indicates its 
conservative effect. Overtly, the court creates this strict test to prevent 
fraud by "roommates" but the strictness of the test enforces compulsory 
heterosexuality on couples. Frequent challenges to tenancy inheritance 
certainly influenced the Braschi court to limit sharply which individuals 
qualify as "fa1nily.'~170 Although its recognition of lesbian and gay 
relationships is impressive, the criteria for a gay or lesbian couple are far 
more specific and numerous than for a heterosexual couple, who could 
marry. In this sense, the law, in recognizing but-for queer relationships, 
innoculates itself against the broader queer menace to compulsory 
heterosexuality. 
D. Transforming the Legal Landscape of Queer Lives 
To quote one gay legal activist: "Does everyone who participates 
in an institution, whether it be the National Lesbian and Gay Task Force 
168. Hunter, supra note 133, at 27. I would like to note that Professor Hunter here is 
describing CLS scholars, not her own work. 
169. ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 150 (Annette Lavers trans. 1972). 
170. Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 543 N.E.2d 49,54 (N.Y. 1989). 
Heinonline - -  4 Law & Sexuality: Rev. Lesbian & Gay Legal Issues 120 1994 
19941 QUEER R V T E R S E ~ O N ~  121 
or the practice of law, become co-opted and incapable of proposing or 
achieving reform?"71 In removing rights litigation from strategies for 
change, the co-optation perspective thus seems to promote a strictly 
dichotomized theory of resistance: Either there is change or there is not. 
But "[ilt is not all or nothing."l72 Legal tactics, however, seen as part of a 
plurality of resistances, might begin to reflect the multiplicity of queer 
communities. Mari Matsuda discusses a similarly broad vision of 
change: 
An effort to create a united front can be built upon three 
considerations. First is the recognition that many 
approaches to a single problem may eventually get us 
where we want to go, and that stubborn rigidity in method 
will block coalition-building. Dr. King saw this when he 
said, "Anyone who starts out with the conviction that the 
road to racial justice is only one lane wide will inevitably 
create a traffic jam and make the journey infinitely 
longer." Second, there is the more basic fact of our 
common goal: the transformation of an unjust into a just 
world. This transformative vision can bind us together 
even as our theoretical differences keep us apart. Third, 
the duality of liberal versus radical programs for change 
may be a false one. The liberal vision as developed from 
the bottom may in fact be one of radical social change.173 
Although litigation may not be the principal focus of our efforts, 
contextually it might be useful in pursuing our political goals. Litigation 
cannot provide the complete expansion of rights some expect. But it can 
reform, empower, and raise'awareness. Queers can work for change and 
subversion while being aware of the danger of co-optation by the law. 
The desirability of multi-faceted discourse and tactics is 
one reason why it is fortunate that we have different 
people in different positions: street and . community 
activists, lobbyists, organizers, and academics . . . in 
171. Wolfson, supra note 137. 
172. Id 
173. Mari J. Matsuda, supra note 167, at 352-53. Matsuda here cites M.L. KING, JR, STRIDE 
TOWARDFREEDOM 34 (1958). 
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addition to advocates and attorneys with specific cases. 
No one vehicle or voice can or has to do it al1.174 
The transformation of the legal landscape of queer lives will 
occur through a multiplicity of resistances and activisms. Queer legal 
activists must at once be aware of their role both inside and outside the 
law: to reform and subvert juridical heterosexism. Aware of the Law's 
ability to further co-opt and divide our communities, we must remind 
ourselves that our goal lies not in the maintenance of the law, but in queer 
liberation. 
174. Wolfson, supra note 137. 
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